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1 Introduction
The central topic of moral hazard problem is to design incentives to elicit the agent’s effort.
Higher incentive pay will induce the agent to work harder and consequently bring higher
surplus to the principal. However, the arrangements employers typically reach with their
employees in reality look quite different from the incentive contracts derived by economic
theorists. Low-powered incentives are very common in practice, especially within organi-
zations. Many firms prefer to pay fixed compensation and offer continued employment to
all but clearly unsatisfactory employees. Good examples are the government agencies and
public firms, which are generally blamed for poor performance because their managers and
workers lack high-powered incentives. Based on the standard transaction-cost and principal-
agent economics, several theories have been provided to explain why low-powered incentives
are employed even if objective performance measures are available and agents are highly
responsive to incentive pay.
Williamson (1985) argues that weak incentive arises from opportunism and incomplete-
ness of contracts. He shows that the use of high-powered incentives would raise undesirable
side problems such as exploitation, inefficient asset utilization and accounting manipula-
tions. For example, if supplying a single large customer would require a firm to make a
large investment in an asset that cannot be used readily for other purposes, the supplier
may reasonably fear exploitation by the customer: once the investment is made, the cus-
tomer could force a lower price on the supplier. The problem is not simply that one party
to the transaction may end up being treated unfairly. The bigger problem is that as peo-
ple will anticipate this possibility, the transaction may not take place at all. Even if the
manufacturer intends to keep his commitment, a transaction beneficial to both sides may be
aborted because the supplier cannot trust him. One possible solution to this problem is to
write a court enforceable contract specifying how each party must behave under a number
of different contingencies. Unfortunately as Williamson points out, contracts are not always
effective in preventing opportunism in that due to limits to human information-processing
abilities, it is often impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies, let alone specify them
in a contract. This leaves scope for opportunism, so the supplier and manufacturer have to
replace the high-powered market transaction with low-powered incentive inside firms.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that the power of incentives on some tasks relies
on the principal’s ability to monitor other aspects of the agent’s performance. The agents
may shift their effort from some activities where their individual contributions are poorly
measured to the better-measured and well-compensated activities. For this reason, high-
powered incentive may be dysfunctional in multi-task environment.
The conclusion of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) relies largely on the assumptions that
agent is risk averse and the tasks are substitute. On the contrary, Baker (1992) shows that
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low-powered incentive might arise even with risk neutral agent when the performance measure
used and the principal’s true objective are weakly correlated. That means if the performance
measure does not respond to the agent’s actions in the same way that the principal’s objective
responds to these actions, the firm will reduce the intensity of the incentive contract.
Aside from piece rates or commissions, another way that firms use to compensate agent
is by relative performance evaluation such as awarding promotions to the member of a
work group who performs best. In fact, in some political organizations such as government
agencies, the agents are rewarded mainly on relative performance measures rather than
on their individual output. One function of relative performance evaluation is allowing the
principal to use flatter incentives.1 In this sense, the literature justifying relative performance
evaluations also gives partial explanations on the arising of low-powered incentive.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) show in a standard single moral-hazard framework that the
promotion-based incentive scheme can achieve the same results as other incentive schemes
can. They argue that the dominance of the promotion-based incentive scheme over the
piece-rate linear scheme and the standard bonus scheme arises from the fact that obtaining
ordinal measures generally requires less resources than obtaining cardinal measures. Green
and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show also in the single moral-hazard
framework that the relative performance evaluation incentive scheme may dominate the
absolute performance evaluation scheme when the agents are risk-averse and there are shocks
that are common to all the agents. Obviously, the promotion-based incentive scheme, by
filtering out common randomness, can reduce the risk that would otherwise be imposed
on the agents and requires compensation. Therefore, the relative performance evaluation
improves the principal’s efficiency.
Another class of literature closely related to the present paper is in the area of multidi-
mensional mechanism design. The multidimensional mechanism design problem arises when
the agent possesses multiple characteristics. Its implementability is much more complicated
than that in the unidimensional mechanism design problem because of the lack of a natural
order on types. The most notable publications about multidimensional mechanism design
include Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone´ (1998) and Basov (2001) among many others.
Armstrong (1996) was the first to formulate this problem in a multiproduct nonlinear pricing
setting. In this seminal paper, he develops an integration along rays technique and character-
izes the pricing contract for the case with cost-based tariff. Rochet and Chone´(1998) analyze
1Rank order tournaments is a simple and widely used form of relative performance evaluation. This classical
form of relative performance compensation has the particularity of using only an ordinal ranking of performance.
By awarding high and low prizes based on relative performance, a principal can elicit higher effort level than with
a scheme that involves the same wage bill but equal wages. An agent’s performance is increasing in the spread
between the winner and loser prize, ceteris paribus, rather than the absolute payment levels. It therefore allows
the principal to elicit a higher effort level using lower performance pay.
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a general multidimensional screening model. They show that, in general, the monopolist
will use mechanisms in which there is bunching, i.e., different consumer-types will be treated
equally. They develop a methodology – sweeping technique, for dealing with bunching in
multiple dimensions. Basov (2001) takes advantage of control theoretic tools and develops
a “generalized Hamiltonian approach” for solving the multidimensional mechanism design
problem.
In this paper, we provide a new explanation for the dominance of low-powered over
high-powered incentives from the perspective of multidimensional mechanism design. Our
contributions are three-fold. First, we attribute the missing of incentive to multidimension-
ally asymmetric information. We show that in the presence of one-dimensional asymmetric
information, the second-best incentive contract is flatter than the first-best contract. In the
multidimensional screening model, however, if the base wage depends only on the Σ−norm of
the performance wage, the efficient linear compensation rule contains no incentive component
for most of the performance measures.
Secondly, in contrast to most of the existing literature dealing with the power-of-incentive
issue in the framework of pure moral hazard, our analysis is made in a mixed model of both
moral hazard and adverse selection. The standard moral hazard model concerns only the
trade-off between insurance and incentives. In these environments, the compensation based
on certain “risky” performance measure serves the dual functions of increasing both profits
and risk. A tension between these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse. Higher
pay induces the agent to exert a higher level of effort and thus increases the principal’s profit.
On the other hand, high wage also exposes the agent to unwanted risk, which requires an
extra risk premium as compensation. Consequently, when choosing contract, the principal
trades off the benefits of more effort against higher wage costs. Most of the existing studies
assume that only the agent’s actions are unobservable. In contrast, our paper assumes that
the agent is privately informed about both his actions and types. The principal therefore
is faced with an additional tradeoff – a tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. We
show that the incentive contract is inclined to be flatter in mixed model than in pure moral
hazard model.
Thirdly, we develop a “delegating” method for the complex multidimensional mechanism
design problem. The intuition behind this method is a tradeoff between authority and
complexity. As a centralized way of resource allocation, an incentive mechanism vests all the
decision making authority in the principal, but it needs to process information transmitted by
the agent. The multidimensional information increases the principal’s information processing
cost and complexity of writing a contract. The more authority the principal owns, the
more information he has to process. Therefore, in order to save information processing cost
and avoid complexity of writing a multidimensional contract, the principal may choose to
delegate part of his authority to the agent. Two extreme cases of this tradeoff in practice
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are a decentralized market economy which distributes all the decision making authority to
individual agents but their communications requirements are minimal(See Hurwicz (1972,
1979, 1986), Mount and Reiter (1974), Walker (1977), Osana (1978), Tian(1994, 2004, 2006)
among others for detailed discussion); and socialist economy in which a central planner
has almost all the authority but a great amount of information has to be processed. In
this paper, part of the principal’s authority is delegated to the agent under the assumption
that the fixed component of compensation bases only on a quadratic form (Σ − norm) of
the vector of incentive compensation coefficients. This assumption deprives some of the
principal’s degrees of freedom but decreases drastically the amount of information required.
The multidimensional mechanism design problem is therefore easily solved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic multi-task principal-agent
model is specified in Section 2, along with a characterization of the first-best contract. The
results with unobservable risk aversion are examined in Section 3. The results with unob-
servable cost are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 considers the optimal incentive contract
in a general environment where risk aversion and cost are both unobservable. Finally, in
Section 6, some concluding remarks are given.
2 Basic Model
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which the agent controls n activities that influence
the principal’s payoff. The principal is risk neutral and her gross payoff is a linear function
of the agent’s effort vector e:
V (e) = β′e+ η, (1)
where the n−dimensional vector β characterizes the marginal effect of the agent’s effort
e on V (e), and η is a noise term with zero mean. The agent chooses a vector of efforts
e = (e1, · · · , en)′ ∈ Rn+ at quadratic personal cost e
′Ce
2 , where C is a symmetric positive
definite matrix. The agent’s preferences are represented by the negative exponential utility
function utility u(x) = −e−rx, where r is the agent’s absolute risk aversion and x is his
compensation minus personal cost.
It is assumed that there is a linear relation between the agent’s efforts and the expected
levels of the performance measures:
Pi(e) = b′ie+ εi, i = 1, · · · ,m, (2)
where bi ∈ Rn captures the marginal effect of the agent’s effort e on the performance measure
Pi(e); B = (b1, · · · , bm)′ is an m × n matrix of performance parameters, and it is assumed
that the matrix B has full row rank m so that every performance measure is indispensable;
and ² = (ε1, · · · , εm)′ is an m × 1 vector of normally distributed variables with mean zero
and variance-covariance matrix Σ.
5
Definition 1 (Orthogonality) A performance system is said to be orthogonal if and only if
b′ibj = 0 and Cov(εi, εj) = 0, for i 6= j, that is, B′B and Σ are both diagonal matrices.
Definition 2 (Signal-noise ratio) The signal-noise ratio of a performance measure Pi =
b′iβ + εi is the ratio of the inner product of the expected marginal effect of activity on a
measure divided by the variance of the noise of the measure: γi =
b′ibi
σ2i
.
Definition 3 (Congruence) The congruence of a performance measure Pi = b′iβ + εi is
measured by Υi = cos(b̂i, β), where (b̂i, β) is the angle between the vector of payoff sensitivities
β and the vector of performance measure sensitivities bi.
According to this definition, performance measure Pi = b′iβ + εi is incongruent if vector bi
and vector β are linearly independent, which in turn implies that (b̂i, β) 6= 0. Moreover, a
more congruent performance measure is characterized by a smaller angle (b̂i, β), and hence,
implies a higher measure of congruity Υi due to the definition of the cosine.
The principal compensates the agent’s effort through a linear contract:
W (e) = w0 + w′P (e), (3)
where P (e) = (P1(e), · · · , Pm(e))′, w0 denotes the base wage, and w = (w1, · · · , wm)′ the
performance wage. Under this linear compensation rule, the principal’s expected profit is
Πp = β′e− w0 − w′Be, and the agent’s certainty equivalence is
CEa = w0 + w′Be− 12e
′Ce− r
2
w′Σw. (4)
The principal’s problem is to design a contract (w0, w) that maximizes her expected profit
Πp while ensuring the agent’s participation and eliciting his optimal effort.
The optimization problem of the principal is thus formulated as:
max
{w0,w,e}
β′e− w0 − w′Be
s.t:IR : w0 + w′Be− 12e
′Ce− r
2
w′Σw > 0
IC : e ∈ argmaxe˜
[
w0 + w′Be˜− 12 e˜
′Ce˜− r
2
w′Σw
] .
The IR constraint ensures that the principal cannot force the agent into accepting the
contract, and here the agent’s reservation utility is normalized to zero; the IC constraint
represents the rationality of the agent’s effort choice.
We now consider the effort choosing problem of the agent for a given incentive scheme
(w0, w). Since the objective is concave by noting that the second-order derivative of CEa
with respect to e is a negative definite matrix −C, the maximizer can be determined by the
first-order condition: Ce = B′w. After replacing e with e∗ = C−1B′w and substituting the
IR constraint written with equality into the principal’s objective function, the principal’s
optimization problem simplifies to:
max
w∈Rn
[
β′C−1B′w − 1
2
w′
(
BC−1B′ + rΣ
)
w
]
.
6
The optimal wage contract and effort to be elicited are therefore:
wfb =
[
BC−1B′ + rΣ
]−1
BC−1β (5)
wfb0 =
rwfb
′
Σwfb − wfb′BC−1B′wfb
2
(6)
efb = C−1B′wfb. (7)
The resulting surplus of the principal is2
pifb =
1
2
β′C−1B′
[
BC−1B′ + rΣ
]−1
BC−1β. (8)
A higher incentive pay could induce the agent to implement a higher effort, but it will also
expose the agent to a higher risk. It therefore requires a premium to compensate the risk-
averse agent for the risk he bears. The optimal power of incentive is therefore determined by
the tradeoff between incentive and insurance. Moreover, the results above show that in multi-
task agency relationships the degree of congruity of available performance measures and the
agent’s task-specific abilities also affects the power and distortion of incentive contract, which
is in line with many previously known studies such as those of Feltham and Xie (1994), Baker
(2002) and Thiele (2008).
3 The optimal contract with unobservable risk aversion
The first-best incentive contract stated above relies crucially on the agent’s attitude towards
risk. In the following, we assume that risk aversion r is private information of the agent,
and its distribution function F (r) and density function f(r) supported on [r, r] are common
knowledge to all parties. This assumption is different to most of the previous studies in
which risk aversion is regarded as a publicly observed variable. The principal then has to
offer a contract menu {w0(rˆ), w(rˆ)} contingent on the agent’s reported “type” rˆ to maximize
her expected payoff. {w0(rˆ), w(rˆ)} is said to be implementable if the following incentive
compatibility condition is satisfied:
w0(r) +
1
2
w(r)′
[
BC−1B′ − rΣ]w(r) > w0(rˆ) + 12w(rˆ)′ [BC−1B′ − rΣ]w(rˆ) (9)
Let U(r, rˆ) ≡ w0(rˆ) + 12w(rˆ)′
[
BC−1B′ − rΣ]w(rˆ), and U(r) ≡ U(r, r). Then the imple-
mentability condition of {U(r), w(r)} is stated equivalently as:
∃w0 : [r, r]→ R+,∀(r, rˆ) ∈ [r, r]2, U(r) = max
rˆ
{
w0(rˆ) +
1
2
w(rˆ)′
[
BC−1B′ − rΣ]w(rˆ)}
(10)
2Notice that the optimal incentive contract wfb could be regarded as a “partial” generalized least squares
regression of the payoff sensitivity β on performance measure sensitivities B′. If the agent is risk neutral (r = 0),
and has no task-specific abilities across n independent tasks, i.e., C = diag{c, c, · · · , c}, wfb is actually the OLS
regression parameter of β on B′.
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The “Taxation Principle” [cf. Guesnerie (1981), Hammond (1979) and also Rochet (1985)]
states that (??) is equivalent to the following very similar condition
∃w0 : Rm → R+,∀r ∈ [r, r], U(r) = max
w
{
w0(w) +
1
2
w′[BC−1B′ − rΣ]w
}
. (11)
It is possible to show that U(·) is continuous, convex 3(thus almost everywhere differentiable),
and satisfies the envelop condition:
U ′(r) = −1
2
w′Σw. (12)
Conversely, if (??) holds and U(r) is convex, then
U(r) > U(rˆ) + (r − rˆ)U ′(rˆ) = U(rˆ)− 1
2
(r − rˆ)w′(rˆ)Σw(rˆ),
which implies the incentive compatibility condition U(r) > U(r, rˆ). Formerly, we have
Lemma 1 The surplus function U(r) and performance wage function w(r) are implementable
by the principal if and only if:
(1) envelop condition (??) is satisfied;
(2) U(r) is convex in r.
Substituting U(r) into the principal’s expected payoff, we get
Π =
∫ r
r
[β′e∗ − w0(r)− w(r)′Be∗] f(r)dr
=
∫ r
r
{
β′C−1B′w(r)− 1
2
w(r)′
[
BC−1B′ + rΣ
]
w(r)− U(r)
}
f(r)dr.
The principal’s optimization problem is therefore:
max
U(r),w(r)
Π, s.t.:U(r) > 0, U ′(r) = −1
2
w(r)′Σw(r), U(r) is convex. (13)
The following proposition summarizes the solution of the principal’s problem.
Proposition 1 If the hazard rate Φ(r) is nondecreasing, then the optimal wage contract is
given by
wsb(r) =
[
BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ
]−1
BC−1β (14)
wsb0 (r) =
1
2
∫ r
r
wsb(r˜)′Σwsb(r˜)dr˜ − 1
2
wsb(r)′
[
BC−1B′ − rΣ]wsb(r), (15)
where Φ(r) ≡ r + F (r)f(r) .
3One way to define the convex functions is through representing them as maximum of the affine functions,
that is, s(x) is convex if and only if
s(x) = max
a,b∈Ω
(a · x+ b)
for some a ∈ Rn, b ∈ R and some Ω ⊂ Rn+1. In this example a = − 1
2
w′Σw, b = w0(w)+ 12w
′BC−1B′w, therefore
U(r) = max
(a,b)∈R−×R+
(ar + b) is a convex function in r.
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Proof. See appendix.
To explore some of the properties of our model, let us now work with the special case
in which there exists a one-to-one relationship between the performance measures and the
activities: B = diag{b11, b22, · · · bnn}; the error terms are stochastically independent (Σ =
diag{σ1, · · · , σn}) and the activities are technologically independent( C = diag{c1, · · · , cn}).
Then
wfbi (r) =
biiβi
b2ii + rciσ
2
i
, (16)
wsbi (r) =
biiβi
b2ii +
(
r + F (r)f(r)
)
ciσ2i
, i = 1, · · · , n. (17)
It is obvious that wsbi (r) < w
fb
i (r) for all r except for r = r. The following corollary is
immediate.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the tasks are technologically independent, the error terms are
stochastically independent and the activities and performance measures are one-to-one cor-
responding to each other. Then the power of incentives on all tasks is lower than that in the
first-best contract for all types except the least risk-averse one.
If the risk aversion parameter is unobservable to the principal, the less risk-averse agent
gains information rent by mimicking the more risk-averse one. The amount of information
rent gained by an agent depends on the performance wage of agents with larger risk aversion,
and therefore the basic tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction leads to low-powered
incentive for all but the least risk-averse types.
4 The optimal contract with unobservable cost
In this section we assume that the cost parameter is private information to the agent. To
avoid the complicated multidimensional mechanism design issue momentarily, we assume that
C = cI, that is, the tasks are technologically identical and independent. δ = 1c is assumed
to be distributed on the support [δ, δ], according to a cumulative distribution function G(δ)
and density g(δ).
A contract menu {w0(δ), w(δ)} is said to be implementable if the following incentive
compatibility condition is satisfied:
w0(δ) +
1
2
w(δ)′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w(δ) > w0(δˆ) + 12w(δˆ)
′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w(δˆ),∀(δ, δˆ) ∈ [δ, δ]2. (18)
Let U(δ, δˆ) ≡ w0(δˆ) + 12w(δˆ)′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w(δˆ), and U(δ) ≡ U(δ, δ). Then {U(δ), w(δ)} is
called implementable if
∃w0 : [δ, δ]→ R+,∀(δ, δˆ) ∈ [δ, δ]2, U(δ) = max
δˆ
{
w0(δˆ) +
1
2
w(δˆ)′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w(δˆ)
}
(19)
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or equivalently,
∃w0 : R→ R+,∀δ ∈ [δ, δ], U(δ) = max
w∈Rm
{
w0(w) +
1
2
w′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w
}
. (20)
U(δ) is necessarily continuous, increasing and convex in δ 4 and satisfies the envelop condi-
tion:
U ′(δ) =
1
2
w′BB′w. (21)
Conversely, similar to the case with unobservable risk aversion, the convexity of U(δ) and
envelop condition (??) implies
U(δ) > U(δˆ) + (δ − δˆ)U ′(δˆ) = U(δˆ) + 1
2
(δ − δˆ)w′BB′w = U(δ, δˆ)
, which in turn implies the implementability of contract. We summarize the above discussion
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The surplus function U(δ) and wage function w(δ) are implementable by the
principal if and only if
(1) U ′(δ) = 12w
′BB′w;
(2) U(δ) is convex in δ.
The second-best δ−contingent contract solves the following optimization problem:
max
w(δ),U(δ)
∫ δ
δ
{
δβ′B′w(δ)− 1
2
w(δ)′ [δBB′ + rΣ]w(δ)− U(δ)
}
g(δ)dδ
s.t: U(δ) > 0, U ′(δ) = w
′BB′w
2
, U(δ) is convex
.
Proposition 2 With unobservable cost, if δH(δ) is decreasing, then the optimal wage is
given by
wsb(δ) =
(
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
)−1
Bβ (22)
wsb0 (δ) =
1
2
∫ δ
δ
wsb(δ˜)′BB′wsb(δ˜)dδ˜ − 1
2
wsb(δ)′ [δBB′ − rΣ]wsb(δ), (23)
where H(δ) ≡ 1 + 1−G(δ)δg(δ) .
Proof. See appendix.
We now consider a special case of orthogonal performance measurement system, that is,
BB′ = diag{b′1b1, · · · , b′mbm}, and Σ = diag{σ21 , · · · , σ2m}. The first-best and second-best
wage contracts are:
wfbi (δ) =
b′iβ
b′ibi +
rσ2i
δ
, (24)
wsbi (δ) =
b′iβ(
1 + 1−G(δ)δg(δ)
)
b′ibi +
rσ2i
δ
, i = 1, · · · , n. (25)
It is apparent that wsbi (δ) < w
fb
i (δ) for all i and all δ ∈ [δ, δ).
4In this case, let a = 1
2
w′BB′w, b = w0(w)− 12w′Σw, then U(δ) = maxa,b (aδ + b) is convex in δ.
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Corollary 2 For an orthogonal performance measurement system, the power of incentives
on all tasks is strictly lower than that in the first-best contract for all but the most efficient
types.
When the agent possesses private information on his own cost, an agent with higher δ
could accrue information rent by mimicking the agents with smaller δ. To minimize agency
costs, optimality requires a downward distortion of the power of inefficient types’ incentive
wage.
5 The optimal contract with both unobservable cost and
risk aversion
In this section we assume that both efficiency parameter δ and risk aversion r are unobserv-
able to the principal. They are jointly distributed according to density function f(δ, r) on
region [δ, δ] × [r, r]. It is known that solutions to the multidimensional mechanism design
models differ markedly from and are significantly more complex than their one-dimensional
counterparts, essentially because different types of agents cannot be unambiguously ordered.
Lacking methodology in the most general sense, different authors use different assumptions
and methods to solve the multidimensional mechanism design models in the existing liter-
ature. Armstrong (1996) adopts an integration along rays procedure solving the relaxed
problem of the principal, but the envelop condition could be satisfied by the pointwise max-
imizer only by accident, let alone the convexity condition. In order for the contract to be
implementable, he makes two “separable” assumptions on the indirect and density functions.
Rochet and Chone´ (1998) develop a general technique for dealing with the multi-dimensional
screening problem, but it is workable only in the case where the dimensionality of type space
is as same as the number of the principal’s available instruments. The generalized Hamil-
tonian approach developed by Basov (2005) circumvents this difficulty but it obtains the
optimal contract from a system of partial differential equations, which usually has no an-
alytic solution. Therefore, one often has to rely upon the numerical techniques except for
some very special function form.
In the following, we will treat the choosing of performance wage as a multidimensional
mechanism design problem. In order to get an explicit analytic solution, we impose restric-
tions on the set of implementable allocations by assuming that the performance evaluation
system is such that BB′ = kΣ or the base wage is based on the Σ − norm of performance
wage vector.
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5.1 The performance measurement system with proportionally-varying
deterministic and stochastic components: BB′ = kΣ
If there exists a constant k ∈ R+ such that BB′ = kΣ, then the deterministic and stochastic
parts of a performance measurement system vary in similar ways. With this assumption, the
agent’s surplus could be represented as a function of a scalar θ1 ≡ kδ − r
U(δ, r) = max
w
[
w0(w) +
1
2
θ1w
′Σw
]
≡ u(θ1). (26)
Then, as in the previous sections, we get the convexity and envelop conditions (u(θ1) is
convex in θ1 and u′(θ1) = 12w
′Σw), which in turn implies the implementability of contract.
We also define θ2 = kδ+ r. Then type vector (δ, r) is transformed linearly to (θ1, θ2). Notice
that θ1 is the only variable affecting the agent’s choice, θ2 is irrelevant and has no informative
value to both parties.
For the convenience of discussion, we introduce some new notations. Let D ≡ {(δ, r) ∈
R2+|δ 6 δ 6 δ, r 6 r 6 r
}
and Θ ≡ { (θ1, θ2) ∈ R2∣∣ (δ, r) ∈ D} denote the domain of the
original and transformed types. θ1 = kδ − r, θ1 = kδ − r are minimal and maximal values
of θ1. Let ϕ(θ1, θ2) = f
(
θ1+θ2
2 ,
θ2−θ1
2k
)
J = f
(
θ1+θ2
2 ,
θ2−θ1
2k
)
1
2k denote the joint density of
(θ1, θ2), where J ≡
∣∣∣det( ∂(δ,r)∂(θ1,θ2))∣∣∣ = 12k is the jacobian of the transformation. ϕ1(θ1) ≡∫
Θ2(θ1)
ϕ(θ1, θ2)dθ2 and Φ1(θ1) ≡
∫ θ1
θ1
ϕ1(θ1)dθ1 represent the marginal density and marginal
cumulative functions of θ1, where Θ2(θ1) ≡ {θ2 ∈ R+|(θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ}. Denote by H(θ1) ≡
1−Φ1(θ1)
ϕ1(θ1)
the inverse hazard rate of θ1.
Assumption 1 The inverse hazard rate H(θ1) = 1−Φ1(θ1)ϕ1(θ1) is nonincreasing in θ1.
Assumption 2 k 6 σrσδ , σδ and σr are respectively standard deviations of r and δ.
We further define the following regimes in accordance with three different information struc-
tures. The case where both θ1 and θ2 (or equivalently both δ and r) are observable is labeled
as the first-best regime; the case where only θ1 is observable is called the second-best regime;
the case where neither θ1 nor θ2 is observable is called the third-best regime. We here-
after index the optimal contract and the resulting surplus with a superscript i ∈ {fb, sb, tb}.
Equipped with the above notations and definitions, the principal’s objective is rewritten as:
Π =
∫∫
D
[
δw′Bβ − 1
2
w′(δBB′ + rΣ)w − U(δ, r)
]
f(δ, r)dδdr
=
∫ θ1
θ1
[
w′Bβ
2k
g(θ1)− 12w
′Σwh(θ1)− u(θ1)ϕ1(θ)
]
dθ1,
where g(θ1) ≡
∫
Θ2(θ1)
(θ1 + θ2)ϕ(θ1, θ2)dθ2, h(θ1) ≡
∫
Θ2(θ1)
θ2ϕ(θ1, θ2)dθ2.
As a consequence, the principal’s optimal contract design problem simplifies to a unidi-
mensional mechanism design problem:
max
w(·),u(·)
Π, s.t. : u′(θ1) =
1
2
w′Σw, u(θ1) is a convex function , u(θ1) > 0. (27)
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Using the integration by parts technique, we obtain∫ θ1
θ1
u(θ1)ϕ1(θ1)dθ1 =
∫ θ1
θ1
1
2
w′Σw [1− Φ1(θ1)] dθ1.
Then the principal’s objective can be expressed as:
Π =
∫ θ1
θ1
{
1
2k
g(θ1)w′Bβ − w
′Σw
2
[h(θ1) + 1− Φ1(θ1)]
}
. (28)
We ignore momentarily the convexity condition and simply maximize this expression point-
wise with respect to w to get:
wtb(θ1) =
1
2k
g(θ1)
h(θ1) + 1− Φ1(θ1)Σ
−1Bβ = ρ(θ1)Σ−1Bβ, (29)
where
ρ(θ1) ≡ 12k
g(θ1)
h(θ1) + 1− Φ1(θ1) =
1
2k
θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
H(θ1) + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
.
The only task left is to check the convexity of function u(θ1). Because
u′′(θ1) =
(
∂w
∂θ1
)′
Σw = ρ′(θ1)ρ(θ1)β′B′Σ−1Bβ,
u(·) is convex if and only if ρ(·) is nondecreasing. It holds provided that: (i) H(θ1) is
nonincreasing and (ii) η(θ1) ≡ Eθ2(θ2|θ1) is nonincreasing. Condition (i) is the familiar
monotone hazard rate property, while condition (ii) is equivalent to the requirement that
Cov(θ1, θ2) < 0(See Lemma ?? in appendix). It holds if and only if Assumption ?? is
satisfied because Cov(θ1, θ2) = k2σ2δ − σ2r .
Substituting (??) into (??), we get the principal’s expected profit5
Πtb =
1
8k2
Eθ1
[
(θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1))2
H(θ1) + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
]
β′B′Σ−1Bβ. (30)
If θ1 is observable, we only need to consider the participation constraint u(θ1) > 0 in (??).
Then the second-best wage contract and surplus are:
wsb(θ1) =
1
2k
θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
Σ−1Bβ (31)
Πsb =
1
8k2
Eθ1
[
(θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1))2
Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
]
β′B′Σ−1Bβ. (32)
If both θ1 and θ2 are observable, we get the first-best contract and surplus as follows:
wfb(θ1, θ2) =
1
2k
θ1 + θ2
θ2
Σ−1Bβ, (33)
Πfb =
1
8k2
Eθ
[
(θ1 + θ2)
2
θ2
]
β′B′Σ−1Bβ, (34)
where θ = (θ1, θ2). It is obvious that wtb(θ1) 6 wsb(θ1), which is resulted from the traditional
rent extraction-efficiency trade-off, but wtb(θ1) and wfb(θ1, θ2) are ambiguously ordered. The
5Eθi(·) is the expectation operator with respect to θi.
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intuition behind this is that owning more information about θ2 is not necessarily helpful to
the principal, since θ2 is irrelevant to the agent’s decision making. The principal’s profits in
these cases are well ordered as:
Πfb =
1
8k2
Eθ
[
(θ1 + θ2)
2
θ2
]
β′B′ΣBβ
=
1
8k2
Eθ1Eθ2
[
(θ1 + θ2)
2
θ2
∣∣∣∣∣ θ1
]
β′B′ΣBβ
> 1
8k2
Eθ1
[
(θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1))2
Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
]
β′B′ΣBβ = Πsb
> 1
8k2
Eθ1
[
(θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1))2
H(θ1) + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
]
β′B′ΣBβ = Πtb.
The second line follows from the law of iterated expectation, the third line follows from
Jensen’s inequality since (θ1+θ2)
2
θ2
is convex in θ2.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that a performance system P = (B,Σ) is such that BB′ = kΣ, and
that Assumptions ?? and ?? are satisfied. Then we have
1. the power of incentive in the third-best wage contract is lower than that in the second-
best wage contract: wfbi (θ1) < w
sb
i (θ1) for all i = 1, · · · ,m and θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ1), but it is
unambiguously ordered compared with the first-best wage wfb(θ1, θ2).
2. the principal’s expected surpluses in these regimes are ordered as:
Πtb 6 Πsb 6 Πfb.
Corollary 3 For an orthogonal performance measurement system, under Assumptions ??
and ??, the third-best performance wage and resulting expected surplus of the principal are
given by:
wtb(θ1) =
1
2k
θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
H(θ1) + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)

b′1β
σ21
b′2β
σ22
...
b′mβ
σ2m
 (35)
Πtb =
1
8k2
Eθ1
[
(θ1 + Eθ2(θ2|θ1))2
H(θ1) + Eθ2(θ2|θ1)
]
m∑
i=1
(
b′iβ
σi
)2
. (36)
The efficiency parameter δ and the risk aversion parameter r affect the agent’s payoff in
different ways. δ affects his effort provision (e∗ = δB′w) and thus the expectation of his net
surplus (w0+w′Be∗− 12δ e∗
′
e∗), while r affects his risk premium ( r2w
′Σw). Misreporting these
two parameters helps the agent get information rents with two degrees of freedom. However,
if the variations of the deterministic and stochastic components of performance measures
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are propositional such that BB′ = kΣ, all the information relevant to the agent’s decision-
making is contained in a scalar θ1, and the agent is in fact deprived of one of his degrees
of freedom. Therefore, the multidimensional mechanism design problem simplifies to the
traditional one-dimensional problem. It is worth noting that if there is a single performance
measure (m = 1), the condition BB′ = kΣ is necessarily satisfied. Thus the multidimensional
mechanism design problem arises only in the joint presence of multidimensional types and
multiple performance measures.
5.2 The Σ− norm based base wage: w0 = w0(w′Σw)
To reduce the information required by a mechanism and thus simplify the model, we need
to impose some restrictions on the principal’s authority and then delegate part of it to the
agent. We assume that the base wage is based only on the Σ − norm of performance wage
vector w, that is, w0 = w0(w′Σw) where w0(·) is a function of a scalar variable. That is to
say, the employer determines the base wage solely on the Σ− adjusted length of wage vector
w rather than on the allocations of intensity among different performance measures. In this
case, the contract menu (U,w) is called Σ−implementable if it belongs to
MΣ =

(U,w) ∈ R+ ×Rm| ∃w0 : R+ → R+, such that
U(δ, r) = max
w˜∈Rm
[
w0(w˜′Σw˜) +
1
2
w˜′(δBB′ − rΣ)w˜
]
and
w(δ, r) = argmax
w˜∈Rm
[
w0(w˜′Σw˜) +
1
2
w˜′(δBB′ − rΣ)w˜
]

. (37)
Let
M =

(U,w) ∈ R+ ×Rm| ∃w0 : Rm → R+, such that
U(δ, r) = max
w˜∈Rm
[
w0(w˜) +
1
2
w˜′(δBB′ − rΣ)w˜
]
and
w(δ, r) = argmax
w˜∈Rm
[
w0(w˜) +
1
2
w˜′(δBB′ − rΣ)w˜
]

(38)
be the set of implementable allocations. It is obvious that a Σ−implementable mechanism
is implementable but it is not true vice versa: MΣ ⊂ M. When (U,w) ∈ MΣ, the agent’s
information rent is
U(δ, r) = max
w∈Rm
{
w0(w′Σw) +
1
2
w′[δBB′ − rΣ]w
}
= max
x
max
w:w′Σw=x2
{
w0(w′Σw) +
1
2
w′[δBB′ − rΣ]w
}
= max
x
[
w0(x2) +
1
2
(
δ max
w′Σw=x2
w′BB′w
w′Σw
− r
)
x2
]
= max
x
[
w0(x2) +
1
2
ϑ1x
2
]
≡ u(ϑ1),
(39)
where ϑ1 = δλ1 − r,
λ1 = max
w′Σw=x2
w′BB′w
w′Σw
= λ1(Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2) = λ1(BB′Σ−1) (40)
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is the first (largest) eigenvalue of matrix BB′Σ−1. The corresponding set of optimal wages
for the agent is
W(x) =
{
w ∈ Rm|Σ1/2w ∈ N (Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 − λ1I), w′Σw = x2
}
, (41)
where N (Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 − λ1I) denotes the eigenspace of matrix Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 corre-
sponding to λ1. (See Lemma ?? in appendix for detailed discussion.) As discussed in previous
sections, (??) implies the envelop condition u′(ϑ1) = 12x
2 and the convexity of u(ϑ1) in ϑ1,
which is conversely sufficient for the implementability of contract. We further assume that
ϑ2 = δλ1 + r. Then
δ =
ϑ1 + ϑ2
2λ1
r =
ϑ2 − ϑ1
2
.
The principal’s optimization problem is thus formulated as:
max
x
∫∫
Θ
[
ϑ1 + ϑ2
2λ1
max
w∈W(x)
w′Bβ − 1
2
ϑ2x
2 − u(ϑ1)
]
ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ1dϑ2
s.t. : u′(ϑ1) =
1
2
x2, u(·) is a convex function, u(ϑ1) > 0,
(42)
where ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2) ≡ f
(
ϑ1+ϑ2
2λ1
, ϑ2−ϑ12
)
1
2λ1
represents the joint density of (ϑ1, ϑ2).
Θ =
{
(ϑ1, ϑ2)| (ϑ1 + ϑ2)2λ1 ∈ [δ, δ],
(ϑ2 − ϑ1)
2
∈ [r, r]
}
denotes the region of transformed variables. Letting y = Σ1/2w, the embedded program
maxw∈W(x) w′Bβ can be expressed as
max
y
y′Σ−1/2Bβ, s.t. : y′y = x2, y ∈ N
(
Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 − λ1I
)
.
Applying Lemma ?? in the Appendix, we get the maxima and maximized value of this
program
y∗ = x
QkQ
′
kΣ
−1/2Bβ√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ
Π∗ = x
√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ.
QkQ
′
k is the spectral projector of matrix Σ
−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 corresponding to the first eigen-
value λ1. Following from the spectral representation theorem in linear algebra, QkQ′k is
unique although Qk is usually not. (See Lemma ?? in the appendix for detailed discussion.)
The maxima to the original program maxw∈W(x) w′Bβ is therefore
w∗ = x
Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ
−1/2Bβ√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ
. (43)
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Substituting this expression into (??), we can rewrite the optimization problem of the prin-
cipal as
max
u,x
∫∫
Θ
[
ϑ1 + ϑ2
2λ1
√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβx−
1
2
ϑ2x
2 − u(ϑ1)
]
ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ1dϑ2
s.t. : u′(ϑ1) =
1
2
x2, u(ϑ1) is a convex function , u(ϑ1) > 0.
(44)
For expositional convenience we define the following notations
µ(ϑ1) ≡
∫
Θ2(ϑ1)
(ϑ1 + ϑ2)ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2
%(ϑ1) ≡
∫
Θ2(ϑ1)
ϑ2ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2
ψ1(ϑ1) ≡
∫
Θ2(ϑ1)
ψ(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2
Ψ1(ϑ1) ≡
ϑ1∫
ϑ1
ψ1(s)ds
H(ϑ1) ≡ 1−Ψ1(ϑ1)
ψ1(ϑ1)
,
where Θ2(ϑ1) = {ϑ2 ∈ R+| (ϑ1, ϑ2) ∈ Θ}, ϑ1 = λ1δ − r , and make the following two as-
sumptions:
Assumption 3 H(ϑ1) is decreasing in ϑ1.
Assumption 4 λ1 6 σrσδ , σr and σδ are respectively standard deviations of δ and r.
Integrating with respect to ϑ2, the above optimization can be simplified to a standard one-
dimensional screening problem:
max
u,x
∫
Θ1
[
x
µ(ϑ1)
2λ1
√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ −
x2
2
%(ϑ1)− u(ϑ1)ψ1(ϑ1)
]
dϑ1
s.t. : u′(ϑ1) =
x2
2
, u(ϑ1) is a convex function , u(ϑ1) > 0.
(45)
Ignoring for a while the convexity condition and applying the standard technique, we obtain
the solution to the relaxed problem:
x∗(ϑ1) =
√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ
2λ1
µ(ϑ1)
%(ϑ1) + [1−Ψ1(ϑ1)]
=
√
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ−1/2Bβ
2λ1
ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
.
(46)
We now need to verify the convexity of u(·), which is equivalent to say that x(·) is an
increasing function. It holds provided that (i) Assumption ?? is satisfied, (ii) ξ(ϑ1) ≡
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Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1) is decreasing in ϑ1. Condition (ii) is satisfied if and only if Assumption ?? holds
because Cov(ϑ1, ϑ2) = λ21σ
2
δ − σ2r 6 0. Substituting (??) into (??) we get the optimal wage
w∗(ϑ1) =
1
2λ1
ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ
−1/2Bβ. (47)
The information rent accrued to the agent and surplus of the principal are also easily ob-
tained:
u∗(ϑ1) =
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ
−1/2Bβ
8λ21
∫ ϑ1
ϑ1
(
ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
)2
dϑ1 (48)
Π∗ =
1
8λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
β′B′Σ−1/2QkQ′kΣ
−1/2Bβ. (49)
The above analysis can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions ?? and ?? are satisfied. Then the Σ−implementable
allocations are given by (??) and (??), and the resulting surplus is given by (??).
In the original model, the contract {w0(δ, r), w(δ, r)} is implementable if for all (δ, δˆ, r, rˆ) ∈
[δ, δ]2 × [r, r]2, the following incentive compatibility condition is satisfied:
w0(δ, r) +
1
2
w(δ, r)′ (δBB′ − rΣ)w(δ, r) > w0(δˆ, rˆ) + 12w(δˆ, rˆ)
′ (δBB′ − rΣ)w(δˆ, rˆ). (50)
Let
U(δ, r) ≡ w0(δ, r) + 12w(δ, r)
′ (δBB′ − rΣ)w(δ, r)
and
U(δˆ, rˆ; δ, r) ≡ w0(δˆ, rˆ) + 12w(δˆ, rˆ)
′ (δBB′ − rΣ)w(δˆ, rˆ).
Then {U(δ, r), w(δ, r)} is implementable if
U(δ, r) = max
(δˆ,rˆ)∈[δ,δ]×[r,r]
{
w0(δˆ, rˆ) +
1
2
w(δˆ, rˆ)′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w(δˆ, rˆ)
}
(51)
Applying “taxation principle”, it could be equivalently represented as:
U(δ, r) = max
w∈Rm
{
w0(w) +
1
2
w′ [δBB′ − rΣ]w
}
.
It implies that (i) the envelop conditions ∂U∂δ =
1
2w
′BB′w, ∂U∂r = − 12w′Σ′w hold; (ii) U(δ, r)
is convex in (δ, r). Conversely, given the envelop and convexity conditions, we have the
following incentive compatibility condition:
U(δ, r) > U(δˆ, rˆ) + (δ − δˆ)∂U
∂δ
+ (r − rˆ)∂U
∂r
= U(δˆ, rˆ) +
1
2
(δ − δˆ)w(δˆ, rˆ)′BB′w(δˆ, rˆ)− 1
2
(r − r′)w(δˆ, rˆ)′Σw(δˆ, rˆ)
= U(δˆ, rˆ, δ, r).
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U(δ, r) and w(δ, r) are therefore implementable. Thus the principal’s optimization problem
is
max
U,w
∫∫
D
[
δw′Bβ − 1
2
w′(δBB′ + rΣ)w − U(δ, r)
]
dδdr
s.t. :
∂U
∂δ
=
1
2
w′BB′w,
∂U
∂r
= −1
2
w′Σ′w,
U(δ, r) > 0,
U(δ, r) is convex.
Ignoring momentarily the convexity condition, the principal’s relaxed problem could be
regarded as an optimal control problem with multiple controls and double-fold integrals.
The generalized Hamiltonian approach offered by Basov (2005) is applicable to this problem.
His method however ensures the existence of solution to the relaxed problem rather than
offers a feasible way for getting it. One often has to rely upon the numerical techniques
to get solution from a system of partial differential equations. A more serious drawback of
his approach is that the solution to the relaxed problem usually cannot solve the complete
problem because the convexity condition could only be satisfied by accident. In fact the
envelop and convexity conditions require that the vector field (12w
′BB′w,− 12w′Σ′w) has a
convex potential function. This puts severe restrictions on the set of implementable wages
and makes the multidimensional problem much more complex than its unidimensional coun-
terpart because the latter requires only that 12w
′BB′w or − 12w′Σw has a convex primitive
function.
In order to get an explicit solution to the complete problem, we therefore sacrifice some of
the principal’s degrees of freedom by restricting our attention in the set of Σ−implementable
allocations MΣ. We decompose the information contained in vector w into two aspects:
its Σ−norm (√w′Σw = x) and direction. Meanwhile, the type vector (δ, r) is transformed
linearly to (ϑ1, ϑ2). Notice that, the Σ−norm of wage vector depends only on ϑ1, while its
direction is at free disposal of the agent and depends on neither ϑ1 nor ϑ2. Our Σ−norm-
based assumption on the base wage w0 limits greatly the authority of the principal since he
now has only the discretion to choose x contingent on the agent’s report ϑˆ1. The authority
of the agent, on the contrary, is augmented since he is vested the authority of choosing the
direction of w. Thus, this procedure is virtually a process of delegating part of the principal’s
authority to the agent. Under the assumptions we made, the multidimensional mechanism
problem is solved with the same amount of computational work as in the one-dimensional
screening problem after performing integration with respect to the irrelevant variable ϑ2.
In a special case of orthogonal performance measurement system, we have the following
corollary.
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Corollary 4 For an orthogonal performance measurement system, there is no incentive in
the performance measures with non-largest signal-noise ratio.
Proof. See appendix.
As mentioned above, the wage vector is determined by two aspects: its overall inten-
sity (Σ − norm) and relative allocation among performance measures (direction). In our
dimensionality-reducing procedure, the authority of choosing relative allocation is delegated
to the agent. Then for an orthogonal system in which performance measures are totally
independent to each other, the agent inclines to allocate the overall intensity to the mea-
sures with larger sensitivity (measured by ‖bi‖2) and smaller randomness (measured by σ2i ).
Therefore he will put the overall intensity of incentives on the measures with largest signal-
noise ratio ‖bi‖2/σ2i , and the measures with non-largest signal-noise ratios will be assigned
zero incentive.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) show that missing incentive clauses are commonly ob-
served in practice, even when good, objective output measures are available and agents are
highly responsive to incentive pay. In their model, there exist multiple performance measures
with varying degrees of accuracy (the tasks and performance measures are one-to-one corre-
sponding to each other, that is, B = I), and the tasks are substitute to each other. In this
setup, employees will concentrate their attention (effort) on improving the performance mea-
sure tied to high compensation, to the exclusion of hard-to-measure or even non-observable
but important tasks. Therefore an optimal incentive contract can be to pay a fixed wage
independent of measured performance. Our Corollary ?? offers a different explanation to
the missing incentive phenomenon. Notice that in this corollary, we assume the performance
measures are orthogonal to each other, which is quite different to the substitute condition
required by Holmstrom and Milgrom’s paper.
The following corollary provides a comparison of surpluses obtained using two perfor-
mance measurement systems with the same largest signal-noise ratios.
Corollary 5 If two orthogonal performance measurement systems P1 ≡ (B1,Σ11) and P2 ≡
(B2,Σ22) are such that matrices Σ
−1/2
11 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 and Σ
−1/2
22 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 have the same first
eigenvalues λ1 and the multiplicities of λ1 in these two matrices are, respectively, k1 and
k2, then Π∗(P1) > Π∗(P2) if and only if the sum of squares of congruences of the first
k1 performance measures in P1 is larger than that of the first k2 performance measures in
P2,i.e.,
∑k1
i=1Υ
2
i1 >
∑k2
i=1Υ
2
i2.
Proof. See appendix.
We next discuss the value of additional performance measures to an existing set. Let
P1 = (B1,Σ11) represent a performance measurement system that reports m1 measures and
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let
P ≡ (B,Σ) =
 B1
B2
 ,
 Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22

represent a system that reports an additional m2 measures P2 = (B2,Σ22). P1 and P2 are
supposed to be orthogonal to each other. That is to say, Σ12 = 0,Σ21 = 0, B′1B2 = 0, B
′
2B1 =
0. Denote the set of eigenvalues of Σ−1/211 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 and Σ
−1/2
22 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 , respectively, by
λi, i = 1, · · ·m1 and µj , j = 1, · · · ,m2. The first eigenvalues λ1 = max16i6m1λi and µ1 =
max16j6m2µj have multiplicities k1 and k2 respectively. The following corollary provides
a specification of the incremental expected value of the additional performance measures
provided by P.
Corollary 6 If λ1 > µ1, then Π∗(P) = Π∗(P1); if λ1 = µ1, then Π∗(P) = Π∗(P1) +
Π∗(P2) > Π∗(P1); if λ1 < µ1, then Π∗(P) = Π∗(P2).
Proof. See appendix.
In the environment of complete information (with observable costs and risk aversion),
Feltham and Xie (1994) show that the incremental value of additional performance measures
is always non-negative because the principal can always assign zero incentive to the additional
measures. In this case, the principal’s surplus obtained using the original performance system
P1 = (B1,Σ11) is
pifb(P1) = δ2β
′B′1
(
B1B
′
1 +
r
δ
Σ11
)−1
B1β;
the surplus obtained using the augmented performance measurement system
P = (P1,P2) =
 B1
B2
 ,
 Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22

is
pifb(P1) = δ2β
′B′
(
BB′ +
r
δ
Σ
)−1
Bβ.
The incremental value of additional performance measures is thus:
∆pi = pifb(P)− pifb(P1) = δ2β
′(D −D1)β,
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where
D1 = B′1
(
B1B
′
1 +
r
δ
Σ
)−1
B1
D = B′
(
BB′ +
r
δ
Σ
)−1
B
= (B′1, B
′
2)
 B1B′1 + rδΣ11 B1B′2 + rδΣ12
B2B
′
1 +
r
δΣ21 B2B
′
2 +
r
δΣ22
−1 B1
B2

= (B′1, B
′
2)
 H11 H12
H21 H22
−1 B1
B2

= (B′1, B
′
2)
 H−111 +H−111 H12H−122·1H21H−111 −H−111 H12H−122·1
−H−122·1H21H−111 H−122·1
 B1
B2

= B′1H
−1
11 B1 +B
′
1H
−1
11 H12H
−1
22·1H21H11B1 −B′1H11H12H−122·1B2
−B′2H−122·1H21H−111 B1 +B′2H−122·1B2
Hij = BiB′j +
r
δ
Σij ,
H22·1 = H22 −H21H−111 H12.
It follows thatD−D1 = B′1H−111 H12H−122·1H21H11B1−B′1H11H12H−122·1B2−B′2H−122·1H21H−111 B1+
B′2H
−1
22·1B2 = [B
′
1H
−1
11 H12 −B′2]H−122·1[H21H−111 B1 −B2] is a semi-positive definite matrix. It
in turn implies that ∆pi = δ2β
′(D −D1)β > 0. As a special case, if P1 is orthogonal to P2,
D −D1 = B′2H−122 B2; therefore, ∆pi = δ2β′B2
(
B2B
′
2 +
r
δΣ22
)−1
B2β = pifb(P2) > 0.
The incremental value then is zero if and only if the measures provided by the original
performance measurement system are a sufficient statistic for the measures provided by the
augmented system, with respect to the agent’s effort. According to this result, adding a
performance measurement system which is orthogonal to the original one will increase the
surplus for sure. Our result, on the contrary, states that the incremental value is zero if
λ1 > µ1; is positive if λ1 = µ1; is ambiguous if λ1 < µ1. These new results come from the
assumption that w0 is based on the Σ−norm of w. Under this assumption, the performance
measures associated with non-largest eigenvalues are in fact redundant, and the incremental
value is therefore determined by the first eigenvalues of the original and new performance
measurement systems.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explain the phenomenon of low-powered incentives from a new perspective.
We consider a case where the agent possesses private information about his own risk aversion
and the cost of efforts. Besides the rents eliciting the agent’s efforts, the principal has to
give up some additional information rents to the agent in order to elicit his truthtelling.
She has to consider two tradeoffs when choosing the optimal incentive contract. One is the
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tradeoff between insurance and incentives; the other is the tradeoff between efficiency and rent
extraction. The former is the fundamental issue in moral hazard problem; while the latter
lies in the core of adverse selection problem. These two “tradeoffs” together lead to lower-
powered incentives. We further show that in the presence of mere unobservable risk aversion
or cost, the second-best incentive contract is flatter than the first-best one. In the case
with multidimensionally asymmetric information, we first assume that the deterministic and
stochastic components of a performance measurement system vary in a similar way. Under
this assumption, the agent’s private information relevant to his decision making is captured
in a single scalar variable. The power of incentive is lower than that in the case where
this scalar variable is observable. Furthermore, we reduce the complexity of computation
by delegating part of the principal’s decision-making authority to the agent. In this setup,
we find that most performance measures are redundant and are compensated by fixed wage.
This provides a new explanation to the frequently-observed phenomenon of missing incentive.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition ??. Using the envelop condition U ′(r) = − 12w′Σw, the participation
constraint U(r) > 0 simplifies to U(r¯) > 0. Incentive compatibility implies that only the
participation constraint of the most risk averse type can be binding, i.e., U(r¯) = 0. We
therefore get
U(r) =
∫ r¯
r
1
2
w(r˜)′Σw(r˜)dr. (A.1)
The principal’s objective function becomes
Π =
∫ r
r
{
β′C−1B′w(r)− 1
2
w(r)′
[
BC−1B′ + rΣ
]
w(r)−
∫ r¯
r
1
2
w(r˜)′Σw(r˜)dr
}
f(r)dr
which, by an integration of parts, gives∫ r
r
{
β′C−1B′w(r)− 1
2
w(r)′
[
BC−1B′ +
(
r +
F (r)
f(r)
)
Σ
]
w(r)
}
f(r)dr.
Maximizing pointwise the above expression, we get
wsb(r) =
[
BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ
]−1
BC−1β
and
wsb0 (r) =
1
2
∫ r
r
wsb(r˜)′Σwsb(r˜)dr˜ − 1
2
wsb(r)′
[
BC−1B′ − rΣ]wsb(r).
The only work left is to verify the convexity of U(r). Notice that
U ′′(r) = −(Drwsb)′Σwsb = Φ′(r)wsb(r)′Σ
[
BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ
]−1
Σwsb(r).
The second equality comes from the fact that the derivative of wsb with respect to r is6
Drw
sb = − [BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ]−1 Φ′(r)Σ [BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ]−1BC−1β
= −Φ′(r) [BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ]−1 Σwsb.
It is clear that U ′′(r) > 0 because Φ′(r) > 0 and the matrix Σ
[
BC−1B′ +Φ(r)Σ
]−1 Σ is
positive definite. The proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition ??. Using integration by parts, we get∫ δ
δ
U(δ)g(δ) =
∫ δ
δ
[
1−G(δ)
g(δ)
]
w′BB′w
2
dG(δ).
Substituting it into the expression of the principal’s expected surplus and optimizing it with
respect to w, we get the second-best performance wage wsb(δ) , and wsb0 (δ) is also easily
6Let A be a nonsingular, m×m matrix whose elements are functions of the scalar parameter α, then
∂A−1
∂α
= −A−1 ∂A
∂α
A−1.
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obtained. We now check the convexity of U(δ). The first order derivative of wsb(δ) is
Dδw
sb(δ) = −
[
H(δ)BB′ +
r
δ
Σ
]−1 [
H ′(δ)BB′ − rΣ
δ2
] [
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
]−1
Bβ
= −
[
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
]−1 [
H ′(δ)BB′ − rΣ
δ2
]
wsb(δ)
= −
[
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
]−1{
−H(δ)
δ
BB′ − rΣ
δ2
+
[
H(δ)
δ
+H ′(δ)
]
BB′
}
wsb(δ)
=
1
δ
{
(BB′)−1 −
[
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
]−1
[H(δ) + δH ′(δ)]
}
BB′wsb(δ).
It can be verified that the matrix 1δ
{
(BB′)−1 − [H(δ)BB′ + rΣδ ]−1 [H(δ) + δH ′(δ)]} is pos-
itive definite since δ + 1−G(δ)g(δ) = δH(δ) is decreasing. Therefore
U ′′(δ) = Dδwsb(δ)BB′wsb(δ)
=
1
δ
wsb(δ)′BB′
{
(BB′)−1 −
[
H(δ)BB′ +
rΣ
δ
]−1
[H(δ) + δH ′(δ)]
}
BB′wsb(δ) > 0,
which implies the convexity of U(δ).
Lemma A.1 E(Y |X) is nonincreasing in X if and only if Cov(X,Y ) 6 0.
Proof. Because Cov(X,Y ) = E(X)E(Y ) − E(XY ) = E(X)E[E(Y |X)] − E[E(XY |X)] =
E(X)E[E(Y |X)]− E[XE(Y |X)] = Cov[X,E(Y |X)], Cov(X,Y ) 6 0 if and only if E(Y |X)
is a nonincreasing function of X.7
Lemma A.2 Let A,B be m×m symmetric matrices and B > 0, then
max
x6=0
x′Ax
x′Bx
= λ1(B−1/2AB−1/2)
and the optimal x satisfies: B−1/2x ∈ N (B−1/2AB−1/2 − λ1I).
Proof. Let B
1/2x√
x′Bx
= y. Then
max
x6=0
x′Ax
x′Bx
= max
‖y‖=1
y′B−1/2AB−1/2y.
Since B−1/2AB−1/2 is a symmetric matrix, there exists an orthogonal matrix P such that
P ′B−1/2AB−1/2P = diag{λ1, · · · , λm}. λ1, · · · , λm are eigenvalues of B−1/2AB−1/2 in de-
scending order; λ1 has multiplicity k. Let P ′y = z, then
max
‖y‖=1
y′B−1/2AB−1/2y = max
‖z‖=1
z′diag{λ1, · · · , λm}z = max
16j6m
λj .
The optimal solution to this problem is z = (z1, · · · , zk, 0, · · · , 0)′ with
∑k
j=1 z
2
j = 1. We get
y = Pz =
∑k
i=1 zipi. pi, i = 1, · · · , k are eigenvectors associated with λ1 = · · · = λk, there-
fore y ∈ N (B−1/2AB−1/2 − λ1I), which in turn implies that B−1/2x ∈ N (B−1/2AB−1/2 −
λ1I).
7Here we use a result in probability theory: Cov(ϕ1(X), ϕ2(X)) 6 0 iff ϕ′1(X)ϕ′2(X) 6 0.
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Lemma A.3 The maxima x∗ and maximized value Π∗ to program
max :
x
α′x, s.t. : ‖x‖ = a, x ∈ N (A− λI) (A.2)
are
(i) If α′QkQ′kα 6= 0
x∗ = a
QkQ
′
kα√
α′QkQ′kα
,
Π∗ = a
√
α′QkQ′kα
(ii) If α′QkQ′kα = 0
x∗ is an arbitrary non-null element in N (A− λI) with norm a
Π∗ = 0
where λ is an eigenvalue of symmetric matrix A with multiplicity k, N (A−λI) represents the
eigenspace of A associated with λ, Qk = (q1, q2, · · · , qk) are a set of orthonormal eigenvectors
of A corresponding to λ.
Proof. SinceA is a real symmetric matrix, there exists an orthogonal matrixQ = (q1, · · · , qn) =
(Qk, Q−k) such that
Q′AQ = diag{λ, · · ·λ, λk+1, · · · , λn}.
Qk = (q1, q2, · · · , qk) are a set of orthonormal eigenvectors associated with λ, Q−k =
(qk+1, · · · , qn) is the set of remaining orthonormal eigenvectors. Applying the spectral decom-
position theorem in matrix algebra, the spectral projector matrix QkQ′k is unique although
Qk is in general not unique.
(A− λI)x = 0⇐⇒ Qdiag{0, · · · , 0, λ− λk+1, · · · , λ− λn}Q′x = 0
Letting Q′x = y, we get
diag{0, · · · , 0, λ− λk+1, · · · , λ− λn}y = 0,
which implies yi = 0, i = k + 1, · · ·n. Then the program (??) can be rewritten as
max :
y
α′Qy, s.t. : ‖y‖ = a, y = (y1, · · · , yk, 0, · · · , 0).
• If α′QkQ′kα = 0, then Q′kα = 0. Therefore,
α′Qy = (0, · · · , 0, α′qk+1, α′qn)

y1
...
yk
0
...
0

= 0
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The maxima to the program (??) is therefore an arbitrary non-null vector in N (A−λI)
with norm a.
• If α′QkQ′kα 6= 0, it is optimal to choose
y∗ =
a√
α′QkQ′kα
(Qk,0)′α,
the corresponding optimal value is
Π∗ = a
√
α′QkQ′kα.
The maxima for the original program is therefore
x∗ = Qy∗ = a
QkQ
′
kα√
α′QkQ′kα
.
Lemma A.4 (Uniqueness of Spectral Representation) A represents an n×n symmetric ma-
trix, Q represents an n × n orthogonal matrix, D = diag{d1, · · · , dn} is an n × n diagonal
matrix such that Q′AQ = D.(Note that every real symmetric matrix is orthogonally diago-
nalizable.) The ith columns of Q are qi, i = 1, · · · , n,respectively. λ1, · · · , λk represent the
distinct eigenvalues of A, ν1, · · · νk represent the (algebraic or geometric) multiplicities of
λ1, · · · , λk, respectively. For j = 1, · · · , k, Sj = {i : di = λj} represent the set comprising
the νj values of i such that di = λj. Then A can be expressed uniquely (aside from the
ordering of the terms) as
A =
k∑
j=1
λjEj (A.3)
where (for j = 1, · · · , k) Ej =
∑
i∈Sj qiq
′
i, qi, i ∈ Sj are eigenvectors associated with λj.
Proof. Suppose that P is an n×n orthogonal matrix andD∗ = {di} an n×n diagonal matrix
such that P ′AP = D∗ (where P and D∗ are possibly different from Q and D). Further,
denote the first,· · ·nth columns of P by p1, · · · , pn, respectively, and (for j = 1, · · · , k) let
Sj = {i : d∗i = λj}. Then, analogous to the decomposition A =
∑k
j=1 λjEj , we have the
decomposition
A =
k∑
j=1
λjFj
where (for j = 1, · · · , k) Fj =
∑
j∈S∗j pjp
′
j . Now, for j = 1, · · · , k, let Qj = (qi1 , ...,qiνj
) and Pj = (pi∗1 , · · · ,pi∗νj ) where i1, · · · , iνj and i
∗
1, · · · , i∗νj are the elements of Sj and S∗j
, respectively. Then, C(Pj) = N (A − λjI) = C(Qj) (the symbol C(A) denotes the column
space of a matrix A), so that Pj = QjLj for some νj × νj matrix Lj . Moreover, since clearly
Q′jQj = Iνj and P
′
jPj = Iνj ,
L′jLj = L
′
jQ
′
jQjLj = P
′
jPj = I,
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implying that Lj is an orthogonal matrix. Thus,
Fj = PjP ′j = QjLjL
′
jQ
′
j = QjIQ
′
j = QjQ
′
j = Ej .
We conclude that the decomposition A =
∑k
j=1 λjFj is identical to the decomposition A =∑k
j=1 λjEj , and hence that the decomposition A =
∑k
j=1 λjEj is unique (aside from the
ordering of terms).
Proof of Corollary ??. Let P = (B,Σ) be an orthogonal performance measurement sys-
tem with Σ = diag{σ21 , σ22 , · · · , σ2m}, BB′ = diag{‖b1‖2, · · · , ‖bm‖2}, then Σ−
1
2BB′Σ−
1
2 =
diag{λ1, · · · , λm}, λi = ‖bi‖2/σ2i , i = 1, · · · ,m are eigenvalues in descending order. λ1 =
λ2 = · · · = λk > λk+1 > · · · > λm. Let p = (p1, · · · , pm)′ ∈ Rm be the normalized
eigenvector associated with λ1. Then
p′Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2p = λ1
It follows that
λ1
k∑
j=1
p2j +
m∑
j=k+1
λjp
2
j = λ1
m∑
j=1
p2j
Then we obtain
pj = 0,∀j = k + 1, · · ·m.
Therefore we write
Qk =
 Q˜k
0
 ,
where Q˜k is a k × k orthogonal matrix. Substituting it into (??), we get
w∗(ϑ1) =
1
2λ1
ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)

b′1β/σ
2
1
...
b′kβ/σ
2
k
0
...
0

. (A.4)
The optimal wages paid for the performance measures associated with the non-largest eigen-
values are zero: w∗i (ϑ1) = 0, for all i = k + 1, · · · ,m.
Proof of Corollary ??. For an orthogonal measurement system P = (B,Σ), eigenvalues
of diagonal matrix Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 are in fact the signal-noise ratios of measures in P:
λi =
b′ibi
σ2i
. Suppose that P1 and P2 are orthogonal systems with the same first eigenvalues
λ1 = λ1(Σ
−1/2
11 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 ) = λ1(Σ
−1/2
22 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 ), the multiplicities of λ1 are respectively
k1 and k2 in Σ
−1/2
11 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 and Σ
−1/2
22 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 . Then the surplus obtained using
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system P1 is
Π∗(P1) = κ(λ1)β′B′1Σ−1/211 Q1Q′1Σ−1/211 B1β
= κ(λ1)β′B′1
 Λk1 0
0 Λm1−k1
 Ik1 0
0 0
 Λk1 0
0 Λm1−k1
B1β
= κ(λ1)β′
k1∑
i=1
b1i b
1′
i
σ2i
β
= κ(λ1)
k1∑
i=1
‖b1i ‖2‖β‖2 cos2(b̂1i , β)
σ2i
= κ(λ1)λ1‖β‖2
k1∑
i=1
cos2(b̂1i , β)
= κ(λ1)λ1‖β‖2
k1∑
i=1
Υ2i1
Where
κ(λ1) ≡ 18λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
=
1
2
Eϑ1
[
(E(δ|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
=
1
2
∫ 
( ∫
δf(δ,λ1δ−ϑ1)dδ
ψ1(ϑ1)
)2
1−Ψ1(ϑ1)
ψ1(ϑ1)
+
∫
ϑ2ψ(ϑ1,ϑ2)dϑ2
ψ1(ϑ1)
ψ1(θ1)
dϑ1 (A.5)
=
1
2
∫  (∫ δf(δ, λ1δ − ϑ1)dδ)2
Pr(λ1δ − r > ϑ1) +
∫
ϑ2f
(
ϑ1+ϑ2
2λ1
, ϑ2−ϑ12
)
1
2λ1
dϑ2
dϑ1
=
1
2
∫ [ (∫
δf(δ, λ1δ − ϑ1)dδ
)2
Pr(λ1δ − r > ϑ1) +
(∫
(2λ1δ − ϑ1)f(δ, λ1δ − ϑ1)dδ
)] dϑ1
8 Λk1 = diag
{
1
σ1
, · · · , 1σk1
}
,Λm1−k1 = diag
{
1
σk1+1
, · · · , 1σm1
}
, b1i , i = 1, · · · ,m1 are the
columns of B′1, Υi1 = cos(b̂1i , β). Similarly, the surplus obtained using system P2 is:
Π∗(P2) = κ(λ1)λ1‖β‖2
k2∑
i=1
cos2(b̂2i , β) = κ(λ1)λ1‖β‖2
k2∑
i=1
Υ2i2, (A.6)
where b2i , i = 1, · · · ,m2 are columns of matrix B′2, Υi2 = cos(b̂2i , β). It follows that Π∗(P1) >
Π∗(P2) if and only if
∑k1
i=1Υ
2
i1 >
∑k1
i=1Υ
2
i2.
Proof of Corollary ??. The matrix
Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 =
 Σ−1/211 B1B′1Σ−1/211 0
0 Σ−1/222 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22

has m1 +m2 eigenvalues λ1, · · · , λm1 , µ1, · · · , µm2 .
1. If λ1 > µ1, then the first eigenvalue of Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 is λ1, its multiplicity is still k1.
If q ∈ Rm1 is an eigenvector of Σ−1/211 B1B′1Σ−1/211 associated with λ1, then qˆ = (q,0)′ ∈
8Here we drop the limits of integrations.
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Rm1+m2 is clearly the eigenvector of Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 associated with λ1. Subsequently,
if Q1Q′1 is the spectral projector of Σ
−1/2
11 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 associated with λ1, then
Qˆ1Qˆ
′
1 =
 Q1
0
( Q′1 0 ) =
 Q1Q′1 0
0 0

is the spectral projector of Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 associated with λ1. Then the expected
revenue of the principal with augmented performance system P is
Π∗(P) = 1
8λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
β′B′Σ−1/2Qˆ1Qˆ′1Σ
−1/2Bβ
=
1
8λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
β′B′1Σ
−1/2
11 Q1Q
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 B1β
=Π∗(P1)
(A.7)
2. If λ1 = µ1, then the first eigenvalue of Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 is λ1, but its multiplicity is
now k1 + k2. Let Q1(Q2) represent an m1 × k1 (m1 × k1) matrix whose columns are
orthonormal eigenvectors of Σ−1/211 B1B
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 (Σ
−1/2
22 B2B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 ) associated with λ1
(µ1). Then the columns of matrix
Qˆ =
 Q1 0
0 Q2
 ∈ Rm1+m2k1+k2
form an orthonormal basis for eigenspace N (Σ−1/2BB′Σ−1/2 − λ1I)
Π∗(P) = 1
8λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
β′B′Σ−1/2QˆQˆ′Σ−1/2Bβ
=
1
8λ21
Eϑ1
[
(ϑ1 + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1))2
H(ϑ1) + Eϑ2(ϑ2|ϑ1)
]
×
β′
(
B′1Σ
−1/2
11 Q1Q
′
1Σ
−1/2
11 B1 +B
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 Q2Q
′
2Σ
−1/2
22 B2
)
β
= Π∗(P1) + Π∗(P2)
> Π∗(P1)
3. The case λ1 < µ1 is similar to λ1 > µ1, the proof is thus omitted.
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